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The implementation of Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) has radically changed the reg- 
ulatory environment for providing payment services in the European Economic Area. The 
main objective of the study is to determine the impact of PSD2 on the number of newly 
established PayTech companies. The second objective is to explain the factors driving the 
distribution of PSD2-licensed entities across the European Union countries. The difference- 
in-difference method and the Poisson regression model served our empirical analysis. The 
results show that the adoption of PSD2 in November 2015 caused a rapid but temporary 
surge in PayTech start-ups in Europe. After national transpositions of the directive, the 
number of new entrants fell in 2018; however, it remained at a higher level than before 
the adoption of PSD2, which indicates its positive impact. The analysis has proved that 
market potential, the characteristics of payment systems, including the popularity of pay- 
ment cards, and the public environment for FinTech start-ups provided by the authorities 
significantly affected the number of PSD2 licences issued. The introduction of the PSD2 
has made the size of the domestic market play a smaller role, as PayTechs can operate on 
a pan-European level also while based in a smaller country. The importance of an open 
business environment has increased and offering regulatory sandboxes has proven to ef- 
fectively support the development of the PayTech sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The establishment and development of PayTech companies, which is a payment services-oriented part of the FinTech
sector, results from the dynamic progress in digital technologies since the beginning of the 21st century in virtually every
branch of the economy ( Gomber et al., 2018 ). However, the payments sector in the European Union (EU) is special in that,
in addition to technological progress, it is greatly influenced by legal regulations that have dramatically altered the relations
between payment services providers and the conditions under which those services are provided ( Jagtiani and John, 2018 ). ∗ Corresponding author. 
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The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) programme and the first Payment Services Directive (PSD) initiated these changes.
However, the real change in the ‘rules of the game’ in the European retail payments market arises from the concept of ‘open
banking’ ( Zachariadis and Ozcan, 2016 ) and the second Payment Services Directive (PSD2), 1 and particularly of its novel ac-
cess allowance to bank accounts for a new category of entities providing payment services – Third Party Providers (TPP),
including non-bank entities ( Drasch et al., 2018 ). Additional regulations accompanying PSD2 ( Wolters and Jacobs, 2019 ) en-
compass Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS), 2 including Strong Customer Authentication (SCA). Clearly, there is a massive
new playing field following these major regulatory changes under which the payment services market functions in the EU
( Donnelly, 2016 ). 
The development of open banking and the dynamic growth in the sector of non-bank PayTech entities requires systematic
research. The first studies on open banking and the API economy ( Philippon, 2017 ; Zachariadis and Ozcan, 2016 ), the legal
( Steennot, 2018 ) and technical aspects ( Mansfield-Devine, 2016 ; Wolters and Jacobs, 2019 ) have been already published
( Gomber et al., 2017 ; Nicoletti, 2017 ). However, research on PayTech entities under PSD2 regulations has not been explored
so far, mainly because of its recent occurrence. Moreover, no comprehensive studies regarding the factors determining the
potential for the development of non-bank PayTech entities in different countries within the European Economic Area (EEA)
have been conducted yet. 
1. The main objective of the study is to determine the impact of Payment Services Directive 2 on the number of newly
established PayTech companies. 
2. The second objective is to explain the factors driving the distribution of PSD2-licensed entities across the European Union
countries. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first academic paper that: (a) applies the new and complex Payment
Institutions Register started by EBA to obtain scientific evidence; (b) quantitatively evaluates the impact of PSD2 on the dy-
namics of incorporations of PayTech start-ups in the EU; (c) jointly examines the market potential of the country and public
environment provided for FinTech start-ups by authorities, and (d) assesses the impact of payment system characteristics
on incorporations of PayTech start-ups. The results are important for entrepreneurs preparing to enter the PayTech market
in Europe, as well as for the EU lawmakers and the financial authorities of particular EU countries, who are considering the
proper approach to licensing and supporting FinTech sector development. 
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a literature review and a description of the PSD2 regulation’s
context, as well as the proposed research model of PayTech development. The data collection process and the growth of
the PayTech market in the EU are presented in Section 3 based on descriptive statistics. The results from the difference-in-
difference method and the Poisson regression model are presented and discussed in Section 4 . The paper is concluded by
providing a summary and establishing the scope for further studies. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Fintech and PayTech research 
The development of digital technologies and the automation of financial services have led to a revolution in the banking
and payment sector ( Bansal et al., 2015 ). It came with the emergence of companies known as FinTechs ( Milian et al., 2019 )
and a change of business models from business- and banking-oriented to customer-oriented ( Alt et al., 2018 ; Navaretti
et al., 2017 ; Vives, 2019 ). 
The term ’FinTech’ is such a new concept that a common definition has not yet been agreed upon. Two main approaches
competing in defining FinTech have been indicated in the literature ( Harasim and Mitr ̨ega-Niestrój, 2018 ). In the first ap-
proach – defining by subject – the emphasis is put on digital technologies, that are implemented by financial entities – banks
or non-banks ( Gomber et al., 2018 ; Ilyés and Varga, 2018 ; Navaretti et al., 2017 ; Vives, 2019 ). The other approach – defining
by object – indicates the separate sector of non-bank financial entities whose business model is based on new technologies
( Alt et al., 2018 ; Mico and Micu, 2016 ; Milian et al., 2019 ; Shim and Shin, 2016 ). However, some also propose definitions that
combine elements from both approaches ( Buchak et al., 2018 ; Kim et al., 2016 ). Between these two approaches, the defini-
tion of FinTech by object provides a practical opportunity to identify and separate entities that can be empirically analysed.
This definition is also more in line with the approach taken under PSD2, where specific licences are intended for non-bank
entities (see 2.2). Therefore, in this work, we have opted for defining FinTech and PayTech by object . In this context, FinTech
entities operating in the payment sector are referred to as PayTechs. 
FinTech has already been the subject of studies addressing many aspects of this phenomenon. An important direction
of research was explaining the factors of FinTech development, i.e. regulatory support ( Gomber et al., 2018 ; Jagtiani and1 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending 
Directives 20 02/65/EC, 20 09/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
337, 23.12.2015, p. 35–127, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/2366/oj 
2 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (Text 
with EEA relevance.) C/2017/7782, OJ L 69, 13.3.2018, p. 23–43, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg _ del/2018/389/oj 
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John, 2018 ; Kalmykova and Ryabova, 2016 ; Lee and Shin, 2018 ; Leong et al., 2017 ; Musa et al., 2017 ; Vives, 2019 ) or
cross-organisational cooperation ( Drasch et al., 2018 ; Polasik and Piotrowski, 2016 ; Szpringer, 2019 ). Competition between
banks and FinTech companies ( Buchak et al., 2018 ; Caporale and Caporale, 2008 ; Jagtiani and John, 2018 ; Li et al., 2017 ;
Saksonova and Kuzmina-Merlino, 2017 ; Vives, 2019 ) and its impact on the stability of the banking sector ( Kavuri and
Milne, 2019 ; Vives, 2019 ) is also considered within this topic. Du et al. (2019) , Gomber et al. (2018) , Jünger and Miet-
zner (2019) examined usage the blockchain technology to financial market applications. However, the field of payments and
development of PayTech entities were studied so far mainly as an addition to other aspects of FinTech ( Gomber et al., 2017 ;
Hill, 2018 ). 
A notable exception is mobile payments that were already extensively studied in many dimensions ( Dahlberg et al., 2015 ;
de Luna et al., 2018 ; Karsen et al., 2019 ; Liébana-Cabanillas and Lara-Rubio, 2017 ). This was due to the growth in of mobile
payment solutions, as a precursor to PayTech ( Iman, 2018 ), both in highly developed and developing countries ( Van Hove
and Dubus, 2019 ) where they additionally play an important role in financial inclusion ( Frost, 2020 ). The strictest legal
framework regulating the PayTech sector exists in the EU, culminating in Payment Services Directive 2. 
2.2. Payment Services Directive 2 
Until the start of the 21st Century, payment services were not the subject to significant EU regulations ( Brener, 2019 ).
This changed with the announcement of the Lisbon Strategy in 20 0 0 and the launch of the SEPA (Single Euro Payment
Area) project. The main aim of this programme was to harmonise and integrate electronic retail payments in Europe
and whose implementation over the past 20 years has brought many changes to payment landscape in Europe ( Bolt and
Schmiedel, 2009 ; European Central Bank, 2019 ; Martikainen et al., 2015 ; Silva et al., 2016 ). 
The regulation of the payment area began with the publication of the Electronic Money Directive (superseded by the
Electronic Money Directive II in 20 09). In 20 07 the Payment Services Directive (PSD) was adopted – a much more extensive
act created in order to restructure and further harmonise entire payments market within the EU. Both regulations created
new entities: electronic money institutions (EMI) and payment institutions (PI), which, after obtaining appropriate licences
from supervisory authorities, have the right to provide payment services alongside traditionally functioning credit institu-
tions (i.e. banks). 
On October 8, 2015, the European Parliament adopted a new directive that would replace the PSD from January 13,
2018, not fully coming into force until September 14, 2019. ‘ The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2) provides the legal
framework for retail payments innovation by setting rules for third-party payment service providers. PSD2 enhances consumer
protection and increases security for payment services .’ ( Mersch, 2019 ). In PSD2, to the previously binding list of services that
can be provided by both credit institutions and payment institutions, were added: (1) payment initiation services (PIS) and
(2) account information services (AIS). In PSD2, the AIS service is defined (in Article 4 (16)) as an online service consisting
in providing consolidated information on at least one payment account held by a given payment service user with another
payment service provider or with more than one service provider payment. The essence of the PIS service (in the context
of Article 4 (15) of the PSD2 Directive) is the ability to initiate a payment transaction by a third party at the request of
the payer from an account maintained by the payment service provider ( Widawski et al., 2016 ). There is also a new licence
(besides the ones concerning PI and EMI) for the Account Information Service Provider (AISP) issued to the entities providing
the AIS service. 
The PSD2 regulation was then transposed into the national law of individual EEA countries. The deadline for this im-
plementation was set to January 13, 2018, but individual countries complied on different dates and usually by changing or
adopting more than one national legal act ( EUR-Lex, 2019 ). 
These services pose a challenge to the traditional model of banks’ operation because they allow external entities, called
Third Party Providers, to obtain information, and initiate payments from consumer payment accounts operated by these
banks. Therefore, the PSD2 Directive means the regulatory constitution of a new business model, which is called ’open
banking’. It was supposed to constitute an incentive to accelerate innovation in the payment services market and create
new opportunities for FinTech start-ups ( Lautenschläger, 2019 ). Verifying if this incentive affects European start-ups is one
of the aims of this work. 
2.3. PayTech development factors 
In accordance with the objectives of the work, two measures of the PayTech development were adopted: (1) the number
of non-bank PayTech start-ups established, and (2) the number and types of PSD2 licences granted in each country. 
Both internal and external factors influence the development of PayTech companies. Internal factors include, amongst
other things, their organisational structure. Due to much simpler structures, PayTechs (but also FinTechs in general) are
more agile, allowing them to deploy new technologies faster than traditional banks; thus they become banks’ competitors
( Davies et al., 2016 ; Jagtiani and John, 2018 ; Leong et al., 2017 ; Saksonova and Kuzmina-Merlino, 2017 ; Szpringer, 2019 ;
Vives, 2019 ). External factors comprise: technology developers, customers using financial services, and other financial insti-
tutions, and the legal environment in which these entities operate ( Alvarez and Barney, 2013 ; Davidsson et al., 2018 ; Lee and
Shin, 2018 ; Ramoglou and Tsang, 2016 ; Shane and Venkataraman, 20 0 0 ). Moreover, external factors indicate technological
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progress, demographic trends, regulatory changes, and changes in the socio-cultural, economic and political environment
( Davidsson et al., 2018 ; Shane and Venkataraman, 20 0 0 ). 
In order to examine the factors significant in the development of PayTech companies, external and internal factors were
categorized into three groups as a research model: (a) the market potential in the country concerned, (b) the level of devel-
opment of the payment system, and (c) the public environment for FinTech start-ups, including the regulatory framework. 
A number of indicators are used in the literature as a measure of market potential (group a - the market potential in
the country concerned),3. such as domestic trade flows and output, proxies for domestic trade cost ( Jacks and Novy, 2018 ;
Redding and Venables, 2004 ), GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, and population ( Reiljan, 2003 ). The article takes GDP
per capita and population as the measures of market potential. 
Customers’ payment habits and the level of development of payment infrastructure (group b – the level of development
of the payment system) may create both opportunities and barriers in the development of individual PayTech solutions
( Bagnall et al., 2016 ; Esselink and Hernández, 2017 ; European Central Bank, 2014 ), and differentiate consumer readiness to
adopt PSD2-based services ( Bijlsma et al., 2020 ). For example, direct debit is seen more as an indicator of the popularity
of traditional banking services ( Wonglimpiyarat, 2017 ). Card payments, on the other hand, are perceived as a method often
used in e-commerce ( Deufel et al., 2019 ) and allowing for simple integration with PayTech solutions, as exemplified by the
payment services offered by BigTechs ( Frost et al., 2019 ). Therefore, issuance and use of payment cards, direct debits, and
credit transfers per capita were applied to measure the development of the payment system. 
Government and regulatory support (group c – public environment) plays an undeniable role in FinTechs’ development
( Jagtiani and John, 2018 ; Lee and Shin, 2018 ; Leong et al., 2017 ; Musa et al., 2017 ; Vives, 2019 ), and sometimes leads start-
ups to apply regulatory arbitrage ( Buchak et al., 2018 ; Frost, 2020 ). For FinTech start-ups, the launch of a regulatory sand-
box and innovation hubs is an important form of direct government support ( European Supervisory Authorities, 2018 ). As
Lee and Shin (2018) point out, governments have a diverse policy on access to financial services. This is particularly impor-
tant for FinTech entities in the payment industry, development rapidly and implementing of new technologies which are
not always kept up with by legal regulations ( Kalmykova and Ryabova, 2016 ). This creates significant challenges for financial
supervision ( Gomber et al., 2018 ). In turn, the general economic climate, including the ease of setting up and running a
business, affects all market entrants ( Djankov et al., 2010 , 2002 ), including PayTechs. The leading indicator of ease of doing
business for researchers, policymakers, and the media is the set of indices presented in the ‘Doing Business’ report, cover-
ing 190 countries in 2018 ( Malone et al., 2019 ; Teague, 2016 ). In the work, the value of the ‘Starting a business’ index and
whether the authorities have created innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes for FinTech were used as measures for the
openness of the regulatory environment. 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, the following research questions arise: 
Q1: Did Payment Services Directive 2 affect the development of the PayTech sector measured by the number of newly
incorporated financial start-ups? 
Q2: Is the size of a national e-commerce market important in attracting PayTech start-ups to establish their headquarters
in a given country? 
Q3: Does a friendly public environment for FinTech start-ups, which may include regulatory sandboxes, effectively stim-
ulate PayTech entrepreneurship in a country? 
Q4: Do the patterns of using traditional banking payment instruments – payment cards, credit transfers, and direct debits
– influence the development of the PayTech sector? 
3. PayTech development in the European Union 
3.1. Data collection 
Data on the payment licences were obtained from the European Banking Authority’s (henceforth: the EBA) Payment
Institutions Register (2020) which is a comprehensive, regularly updated source of data on the licences obtained by non-
bank PayTech companies in the European Economic Area (EEA). The dataset used in this paper was retrieved on 31 December
2019 and contained 5811 payment institutions, 552 branches, and 223,326 payment agents licensed until that date. 3 
The analysis of the EBA data is limited to three types of institutions (henceforth licensed institutions ): (1) Payment Institu-
tions (PI), (2) Electronic Money Institutions (EMI) and (3) Account Information Service Providers (AISP). We excluded institutions
which were licensed outside the full scope of PSD2 and therefore were not allowed to provide payment services outside of
the country they gained licences in. 4 The sample is also limited to EU member states, which results from the fact that
complete and methodologically coherent data pertaining to the payment system and the conditions of doing business are
available only for these countries. 3 Observations with incomplete records were excluded from our sample. This concerned less than 1% of the total number of records. 
4 Excluded categories include: (1) Exempted payment institutions, (2) Exempted electronic money institutions, (3) Service Providers Excluded from Scope 
of PSD2 and (4) Institutions entitled under national law to provide payment services. Most of those exempted companies were providing only local money 
remittance services or could provide issuing or acquiring services only on a very small scale of transactions processed in a year with a value not excessing 
EUR 3 million. 
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Source: Statistics based on the EBA Payment Institutions Register , https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data from the EBA register were supplemented with company data from the Orbis database ( Bureau van Dijk, 2020 ).
All the companies which obtained licences under PSD2 were looked up in the Orbis database for (a) the date of their
incorporation and (b) the identification of their economic activity according to NACE. Dates of incorporation were necessary
to create a variable that aggregates the number of PayTech companies established in each country in a given month within
the treatment group (see Table 4 ), used in the difference-in-difference analysis (see 4.1). Moreover, the six most common
NACE codes of the PSD2-licensed companies (see Table 7 – Appendix), that represent more than 84% of all these companies
were selected as the identification of a control group (see Table 4 ). Then, all companies from EU countries conducting activity
for selected NACE codes were searched, and for such control group data for their incorporation date, the NACE codes and
the country of registered office were received from the Orbis database. 
3.2. Dynamics of the PayTech market development 
The number of non-bank PayTech companies in the EU operating under the analysed licence types has been growing in
the last few years ( Fig. 1 ). A surge in the number of licences occurred in 2018, the year when the majority of EU coun-
tries carried out national transpositions of PSD2. As seen in Fig. 2 , the number of licences granted within the EU increased
fourfold in just 24 months, from 350 entities in 2017 to 1475 entities in 2019. By the end of 2019, the Payment Institution
licence was the most popular amongst non-bank PayTech entities, followed by that of an Electronic Money Institution. Ac-
count Information Service Provider was the least popular licence, mostly due to the short time of its availability up to the
moment of study and the limited scope of activities allowed under this license. 
The PSD2 regulation affects various aspects of the PayTech sector. New opportunities could generate better prospects for
investors and therefore attract new companies (start-ups). For the purposes of the study, the number of newly established
non-bank start-ups, providing payment services under one of the above mentioned PSD2 licences, was used as a measure
of the development of the PayTech sector (see 2.3). 5 
However, the sharp increase in the number of licences granted since 2018 ( Fig. 1 ) does not yet imply the impact of PSD2
on entrepreneurship, and the incorporation of PayTech start-ups in Europe. Also non-bank entities established a long time
before the PSD2 could have applied for the payment licences under the new regulation because it was required for the
continuation of their existing business. In addition, existing entities might have been interested in expanding their existing5 Alternative measures of sector development are not available or reliable. Start-ups are typically not publicly traded and therefore market value data are 
not available. New start-ups also often follow aggressive growth strategies which are not focused on current profits. 
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Fig. 2. Share of licensed PayTech companies by the time of incorporation related to the PSD2 legal process 
Source: Statistics based on the Orbis database ( Bureau van Dijk, 2020 ), the EBA Payment Institutions Register , https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ and PSD2’s 
national transposition dates ( EUR-Lex, 2019 ); Data up until the end of 2019. 
Fig. 3. Comparison of PSD2-licensed and non-licensed company incorporations over time in the European Union 
Source: Statistics based on the Orbis database ( Bureau van Dijk, 2020 ) and the EBA Payment Institutions Register , https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
business into a new area, considering the PSD2 regulations to be beneficial to them. By the end of 2019 almost 75% of all
studied PSD2 licences were granted to entities that had been established before the adoption of this regulation at EU level
(see Fig. 2 ). Thus, only around a quarter of all new PayTech licences were associated with new incorporations and can be
directly related to the stimulation of entrepreneurship by PSD2. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of these newly established PayTech start-ups were founded in the period before the na-
tional transpositions of PSD2 ( Fig. 3 ). This may suggest that investors and innovators in the PayTech industry anticipate
regulatory changes and start new companies well in advance. After the national transpositions of PSD2, the drive to estab-
lish new PayTech entities slowed down. This data significantly change the view on the effects of PSD2’s introduction and
indicate that a detailed quantitative analysis, taking into account external factors, is needed to assess them in depth. 
The tendency to set up new businesses may be related to other factors -macro-economic ones, for instance. Therefore,
the identification of the effect of PSD2 on the PayTech sector ( treatment group ) development needs a comparison with a
M. Polasik, A. Huterska and R. Iftikhar et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 178 (2020) 385–401 391 
Table 1 
EU countries with the highest number of PayTech institutions. 
Country Number of Institutions Average number of markets licensed to be served 
United Kingdom 627 17.31 
Lithuania 100 13.15 
France 82 8.40 
Germany 72 6.88 
Netherlands 57 12.81 
Spain 57 10.04 
Sweden 56 6.86 
Italy 50 2.12 
Poland 45 10.27 
Malta 41 12.80 
Source: Statistics based on EBA Payment Institutions Register, https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
larger group of similar entities not directly affected by PSD2. Such a benchmark ( control group ) was constructed based on
NACE codes of companies from the treatment group. 6 
Fig. 3 compares the number of newly incorporated companies by year – companies licensed under PSD2 ( treatment
group ) with companies from the control group . The number of companies which eventually obtained the payment licences
under PSD2 (until the end of 2019), grew over time. There was a major increase in PSD2-licensed companies in 2017 while
the growth of the control group in the same period remained steady. This suggests a surge in new companies in 2017 in
anticipation of PSD2 implementation. Quantitative verification of this observation was performed in Section 4.2 . 
3.3. PayTech licences distribution in the EU countries 
The cross-country analysis applies two types of general measurements of PayTech development. The first one concerns
the country where non-bank PayTech companies obtain licences (assumed headquarters) and the second comprises countries
where they are allowed to provide services under the PSD2-licences granted (assumed market). 
Based on data presented in Fig. 4 below, the United Kingdom is an unquestionable leader in terms of PayTech develop-
ment. By the end of 2019, the financial supervision of this country issued as many as 627 PayTech licences, which constituted
43% of all 1475 analysed licences in the European Union. Until recently, for other countries to catch up with the UK seemed
an impossible task, as there are several times more PayTech institutions there than in any of the other countries. However,
Brexit may well pose a risk for the UK’s standing, when after the transition period (which ends on 31 December 2020 7 ) all
financial institutions that are licensed in the UK will lose the right to render their services inside EU. Companies that wish
to continue providing PayTech services must apply for a licence in an EU country ( Armour, 2017 ). 
The analysis of the number of licences obtained reveals that the top ten countries include all five largest EU member
states in terms of population and GDP ( Fig. 4 ). It seems evident that this is the result of the great economic potential of these
countries. On the other hand, however, there is a group of smaller EU countries that offer incentives for payment licensing
(e.g. easy registration process), which encourages investors to register there ( European Supervisory Authorities, 2018 ). These
include in particular Lithuania and Malta which have attracted a large number of institutions relative to their population.
Small countries in which the number of registered companies seems to significantly exceed their internal market potential
attempt to be PayTech centres or hubs and make substantial investments in the sector. One of the most interesting examples
of a country developing PayTech sector is Lithuania, which is the second-largest PayTech hub in Europe. Lithuania’s internal
consumer base has a low ceiling, so the attractiveness of its local market for investors is below average. Still, it managed to
attract numerous PayTech entities, focused primarily on providing cross-border services in other EU countries. This implies
that using the strategy of creating a friendly environment for the PayTech sector was successful in the case of Lithuania
( Table 1 ). 
PayTechs may apply for a licence to provide services to more than one country in Europe by the regulations of passporting
for financial institutions ( European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017 ). It allows entities authorised in a European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) state to carry out activities in any other EEA state without additional authorisation. Tables 4 and 5 show
the rankings of the top ten countries in terms of the number of non-bank PayTech institutions licensed and the average
number of markets where these institutions are allowed to provide services. The United Kingdom, Lithuania, the Nether-
lands, and Malta appear in both of these tables. This indicates the significance of these countries in the European Union
as perceived hubs for PayTech companies. In larger countries, with a more traditional approach of regulatory authorities,
PayTech start-ups are allowed to serve a smaller average number of other EU markets – e.g. 2.12 for Italy and 6.88 for Ger-
many. It suggests that payment institutions registered there are mainly focused on the local market. In contrast, companies6 Six most common NACE codes of the PSD2-licensed companies (see Table 7 – Appendix), that represent more than 84% of all these companies were 
selected. We retrieved all EU-based companies sharing these NACE codes from the Orbis database together with their incorporation dates (see Section 3.1 ). 
7 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, p. 7–187, https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22020A0131 (01) 
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Fig. 4. Type and number of payment licences issued in the EU countries by the end of 2019 
Source: Statistics based on the EBA Payment Institutions Register , https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ . 
Table 2 
EU countries with PayTech institutions serving most markets on average. 
Country Number of Institutions Average number of markets licensed to be served 
Luxembourg 20 23.05 
Cyprus 24 21.54 
Austria 6 17.50 
United Kingdom 627 17.31 
Ireland 32 16.22 
Belgium 34 14.88 
Lithuania 100 13.15 
Netherlands 57 12.81 
Malta 41 12.80 
Slovakia 10 12.20 
Source: Statistics based on EBA Payment Institutions Register, https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in Luxembourg and Cyprus apply for licences to provide services in the largest number of markets ( Table 2 ) – 23.05 and
21.54 on average, respectively. It can be assumed that some entities establish their headquarters in these countries because
of regulatory arbitrage ( Boyer and Kempf, 2020 ; Houston et al., 2012 ; Philippon, 2017 ). It seems that these companies are
seeking a friendly regulatory environment in one country, but are focused on serving cross-border EU markets. 
The analysis presented above suggests that both – the size of the local market in a given country and the regulatory
policy – are essential for the development of the PayTech sector. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Data analysis 
Based on the literature review ( Section 2 ) and the developed research framework, a set of variables used for empirical
analyses was selected. They are presented in Table 3 and Table 8 . For the analysis of the incorporation of start-ups based
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Table 3 
Variable definitions. 
variable name definition 
Dependant variables paytechs before psd2 number of entities granted payment licence established before approval of psd2 at the ue level 
( european Banking Authority, 2020 ) 
PayTechs Before 
National Law 
Number of PayTech entities established after PSD2 approval but before the transposition of 
PSD2 to the national laws in individual countries ( European Banking Authority, 2020 ) 
PayTechs After PSD2 
Transposition 
Number of new PayTech entities established after the transposition of PSD2 to the national law 
in individual countries ( European Banking Authority, 2020 ) 
E Number of incorporated companies (market entries) by Orbis database ( Bureau van Dijk, 2020 ) 
Time-variant indicator 
variables 
PAYTECH Indicator variable for companies licensed under PSD2 by the end of 2019 ( European Banking 
Authority, 2020 ) 
EUPSD2 Indicator variable for the period after the approval of PSD2 at EU level ( EUR-Lex, 2019 ) 
NPSD2 Indicator variable for the period after publication of last law implementing PSD2 at national 
level ( EUR-Lex, 2019 ) 
Market potential Population Total Population of a country in 2018 ( Eurostat, 2019 ) 
GDP (in million EUR) Gross domestic product of a country in euros in 2018 ( Eurostat, 2019 ) 
Internet purchase Share of the population using the internet for ordering goods or services in 2018 
( Eurostat, 2019 ) 
Public Environ-ment for 
FinTech start-ups 
Innovation Hubs Dedicated point of contact for firms to raise enquiries with competent authorities on 
FinTech-related issues (European Supervisory Authorities, 2018) 
Sandbox The number of regulatory sandboxes operational in a country (European Supervisory 
Authorities, 2018) 
Starting a business Score awarded to a country for ease of starting a business; an indicator of procedures, time, 
cost and paid-in minimum capital to start a limited liability company asseset in ‘Doing 
bussienss’ report ( World Bank, 2018 ) 
Payment system 
Card payments per 
capita 
Number of card transactions per capita in a country in 2017 ( European Central Bank, 2020 ) 
Credit transfer per 
capita 
Number of credit transfer transactions per capita in a country in 2017 ( European Central 
Bank, 2020 ) 
Direct debit per capita Number of direct debits transactions per capita in a country in 2017 ( European Central 
Bank, 2020 ) 
Cards issued per capita Number of payment cards issued per capita in a country in 2017 ( European Central Bank, 2020 ) 
Instant payments Domestic instant payment system operating in a country [dummy variable 0–1] ( Hartmann 
et al., 2019 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on the difference-in-differences (DID) framework ( Section 4.2 ), the dependant variable E and the indicator variable PAYTECH
were used, which divides the incorporated companies into the control group and treatment group of companies that were
licensed under PSD2 by the end of 2019. Two other indicator variables were used to set the time frame for the impact of
the PSD2 regulation on the payment market. EUPSD2 is an indicator variable for the period after the approval of PSD2 at
EU level on 25 November 2015. NPSD2 identifies for the period after publication of the last law implementing PSD2 at the
national level, separately for each country’s date of transposition ( EUR-Lex, 2019 ). 
Another set of dependant variables – PayTechs Before PSD2, PayTechs Before National Law, PayTechs After PSD2 Transposition
– was used in the modelling of the determinants of the number of licences issued in a given country, based on cross-country
count data analysis ( Section 4.3 ). 
A set of eleven independent variables was used in both types of analysis – the DID method and count data estimations.
The variables are grouped according to the adopted research model ( Section 2.3 ). The market potential is represented by
the following variables: Population, GDP (in EUR million), and Internet purchase . The last variable is particularly important
since PayTech3.’s offer is most often directed to payments in e-commerce purchases. Three variables measure the activities
of authorities within the area of public environment for FinTech start-ups: Innovation Hubs, Sandbox, Starting a business . Five
variables describe the characteristics of each domestic payment system: Card payments per capita, Credit transfer per capita,
Direct debit per capita, Cards issued per capita , and the fact of possessing a domestic Instant payments system . Independent
variables are country-assigned and time-invariant as they are subject to only minor changes over time. 
Table 6 (see Appendix) reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. Cross-country data covers 28
EU countries. They indicate the diverse average levels of the phenomena taken into account. Data differences are particu-
larly pronounced in the case of the payment system. For instance, the average number of card payments per capita varied
between 18 and 366 transactions per year. In some countries, there were no direct debit transactions, while in others, they
were popular. Only four countries had a domestic Instant payment system; still an innovation in Europe. Starting a busi-
ness indicator was less diversified, ranging from 82 points for the most bureaucratic country (Slovakia) to 96 points for the
most business-friendly country (Ireland). As many as 75% of all countries had established an Innovation hub dedicated to
supporting FinTech. However, only 30% of countries had a regulatory Sandbox , since that requires more involvement of the
authorities. Internet purchases were standard in some countries (84% of citizens), while in the least advanced countries they
were only employed by every fifth person. 
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The time-variant variables reported in Panel B (see Table 6 – Appendix) include monthly data for 28 countries from
20 0 0 to 2018, covering the number of newly incorporated entities classified as the control group and the treatment group
(see Section 3.1 ). Since granting a licence under PSD2 usually requires passing a procedure lasting many months, not all
entities incorporated in 2019 could obtain such a licence and be registered in the EBA Payment Institutions Register by the
end of that year. To prevent this fact from impacting the results, it was assumed that the PayTech sector development within
the difference-in-differences framework (see 4.2) would only encompass entities established by the end of 2018. 
4.2. Impact of PSD2 on PayTech sector development 
To verify the effect of PSD2 on PayTech sector development measured by the number of newly incorporated start-ups
(see Section 3.1 ), the triple difference-in-differences (DiD) framework was applied. It allowed us to disentangle the effect of
PSD2 regulation and overall development in the technological (IT) and financial sectors. For the DiD analysis, a control group
was constructed (see Sections 3.1 for the data collection procedure) consisting of companies which (a) are doing business
in the same or similar sector to PayTech companies (as defined by NACE code), and (b) are not subjected to the PSD2
regulation. The control group consists of new enterprises in IT services and non-bank and non-insurance financial activities
(see Table 7 – Appendix). The treatment group consists of PSD2-licensed companies – Payment Institutions, Electronic Money
Institutions, and Account Information Service Providers. 
The PSD2 regulation was introduced in two steps. First, the regulation was passed at the European level and subsequently,
it was transferred by member states into national law (see Section 2.2 ). To capture potentially different effects of both steps,
an estimation of the following empirical specification was applied: 
E ist = α + β1 P ayT ec h i × EUP SD 2 t + β2 P ayT ec h i × EUP SD 2 t × NP SD 2 it + β3 P ayT ec h i + θi + θs + θyear + ε ist (1)
where E i , is the number of incorporated companies, s is sector, and t is time (month and year) t . The effect of passing
PSD2 at European level is captured by the interaction of indicator variable PayTech i which is equal to one for groups of
companies licensed under PSD2, and indicator variable EUPSD2 for PSD2 being approved at EU level. The triple difference
term identifies the effects of PSD2 adoption at national level ( NPSD2 indicator variable). To control for country- and sector-
specific unobserved characteristics, including country ( θ i ) and sector ( θ s ), fixed effects were included. The year fixed effect
( θ year ) controls for idiosyncratic shocks. Variable Ɛist is the error term. 
Since granting a licence under PSD2 usually requires passing a procedure lasting many months, not all entities incor-
porated in 2019 could obtain such a licence and be registered in the EBA Payment Institutions Register by the end of that
year. To prevent this fact from impacting the results, we limit the estimation sample to companies incorporated in 2018 or
earlier. 
The number of incorporated companies is a count data variable with a high share of zeros (79.5%). Therefore the per-
formed analysis follows Silva and Tenreyro (2011 , 2006 ) who propose using the Poisson Pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)
estimator in such a case. 8 
The estimated coefficients for specification (1) are presented in column (1) in Table 4 . Results show that PSD2 approval in
the European Parliament has lead to the growth of the number of companies in the regulated sector. After the introduction
of PSD2, the number of newly incorporated PayTech start-ups increased by 70%. This result is a quantitative confirmation
of the positive impact of PSD2 on the development of the PayTech sector, as suggested by the previous descriptive analysis
(see Figs. 1 and 3 ). 
However, the adoption of PSD2 at the national level cut the surge. After the national transpositions, the number of
PayTech start-ups decreased by 36% on average for all EU countries (compared to the period after PSD2 approval and before
the national transpositions). This suggests that the strong impact of PSD2 was temporary and decreased after the first wave
of incorporations. It can be assumed that this effect was due to the fact that investors and innovators started preparing
to operate under the new PSD2 regulations already after EU-level approval. They rushed to register new PayTech start-
ups to occupy a new attractive market niche before it was even possible to apply for a licence. One can say that in 2017
there was a hype for investing in PayTech start-ups (see Fig. 4 ). However, after the national transpositions of PSD2, when
the new entities had to bear the costs associated with applying for a licence and operating, this market experienced some
rationalisation and a decrease in the number of market entrants. The evaluation of the long term impact of PSD2 on PayTech
sector development will require studies in the future. 
Specifications presented in columns (2)–(5) replace the country fixed effects with various country-level time-invariant
characteristics. Variables tested belong to three areas of the research model ( Section 2.3 ): payment system, public environ-
ment for FinTech start-ups, and market potential. The results indicate that under a payment system Card payments per capita,
Direct debits per capita , and the operation of a national Instant payments system have a positive impact on the number of
start-ups established in a given country, both for the control group and the treatment group. On the other hand, in countries
with a large number of Credit transfers per capita , generally fewer new enterprises were registered. In turn, a country’s high
position in the Starting a business ranking (denoting to a friendly climate for entrepreneurship) has a positive impact on the
overall number of start-ups. The same is true of Sandboxes which, when present, mean that the authorities have the policy8 For interpretation of PPML coefficients see Silva & Tenreyro (2006) . 
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Table 4 
The results of the difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis. 
Dependant variable: number of incorporated companies 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Effect of PSD2 approval at European level 0.530 ∗∗ 0.482 ∗∗ 0.343 0.476 ∗∗ 0.4795 ∗∗
( PayTech i × EUPSD2 t ) (0.220) (0.226) (0.223) (0.224) (0.227) 
Effect of PSD2 transposition to national laws −0.451 ∗∗∗ −0.317 ∗∗∗ −0.176 −0.301 ∗∗ −0.2867 ∗∗
( PayTech i × EUPSD2 t × NPSD2 it ) (0.129) (0.146) (0.174) (0.150) (0.142) 
PSD2-licensed companies −8.413 ∗∗∗ −8.413 ∗∗∗ −8.425 ∗∗∗ −8.413 ∗∗∗ −8.4247 ∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.357) (0.360) (0.357) (0.360) 
Card_payments_per capita 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.0005 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Credit transfers per capita −0.015 ∗∗∗ −0.0031 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Direct debits per capita 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.0117 
(0.003) (0.011) 
Instant payments 1.318 ∗∗∗ 1.1591 
(0.392) (0.710) 
Innovation hubs −0.481 0.1594 
(0.586) (0.954) 
Sandbox 1.628 ∗∗∗ 0.5427 
(0.602) (0.431) 
Starting a business 0.147 ∗ 0.0507 
(0.079) (0.062) 
log( GDP per capita ) 0.314 1.6750 
(0.429) (0.593) 
log( Population ) 0.750 ∗∗∗ 0.5259 ∗
(0.138) (0.270) 
Internet purchase 4.853 ∗∗ 0.1672 
(1.906) (2.939) 
Intercept −8.020 ∗∗∗ −9.884 ∗∗∗ −26.980 ∗∗∗ −27.254 ∗∗∗ −35.0491 ∗∗∗
(1.204) (1.164) (7.314) (4.289) (7.091) 
Country FE Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector (NACE) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered by country and sector pairs are reported in parentheses with ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The treatment group used 
in the analysis was limited to 555 market entries from 719 PayTech start-ups; others had some data incompleteness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to support innovation. An important stimulus for entrepreneurship related to new technologies and FinTech is consumer
use of electronic distribution channels, as more companies are established in countries where online shopping is popular
( Internet purchase ). In turn, the positive impact of country size measured by Population is a standard result. In general, there
were no significant differences between the impact of country-level variables on the number of incorporated companies in
the treatment group and the control group. 
4.3. Cross-country differences in PayTech licencing activity – count data analysis 
The above analysis concerned the EU-wide impact of PSD2 without differentiating the incorporated start-ups according
to the location of their headquarters. Meanwhile, the diversity of the European Union countries means that the development
of the PayTech sector is not evenly distributed. Therefore, an additional cross-country analysis was carried out to examine
the impact of economic factors, the diversity of the payment systems, and the regulatory environment on the number of
each of the three types of PayTech licences obtained in individual countries. 
For the assessment of factors influencing the number of licences granted in a given country, a count variable model (the
Poisson regression model) was estimated. Poisson regression is used to model past events, which, in this study, take the
form of granting a licence to operate as a non-bank PayTech. In the model, endogenous variables that take non-negative
integer values (count variables) were used ( Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 ; Wooldridge, 2001 ). During the analysis ( Table 5 ),
we have separately estimated the number of entities: (a) granted a payment licence established before the approval of PSD2
at the UE level ( PayTech Before PSD2 ), (b) new PayTech entities established after PSD2 approval but before the transposition
of PSD2 to the national laws in individual countries ( PayTech Before National Law ) and (c) new PayTech entities established
after the transposition of PSD2 to the national law ( PayTech After PSD2 Transposition ). Due to the small cross-country sample
covered in the research (28 EU member states), it was indispensable to limit the number of independent variables used to
study the determinants of the number of licences granted (see Table 3 in Section 4.1 and Table 6 in Appendix for variable
descriptions). These variables cover all three areas identified under the adopted research model (see Section 2.3 ). 
The obtained results shown in Table 5 confirmed earlier observations of the distribution of licences by country
( Fig. 4 ; Section 3.3 ), that market potential significantly stimulates the PayTech sector development. It was certainly the
case before the adoption of PSD2. In order to present market potential, two variables were employed – log of Population
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Table 5 
The results of the Poisson regression model’s estimation. 
Variable PayTechs Before 
PSD2 
PayTechs Before 
National Law 
PayTechs After 
PSD2 Transposition 
const −12.9110 ∗∗∗
(1.090) 
−8.865 ∗∗∗
(2.536) 
−22.902 ∗∗∗
(4.652) 
Log(Population) 0.653 ∗∗∗
(0.047) 
−0.181 ∗
(0.095) 
−0.236 
(0.164) 
Internet purchase 2.638 ∗∗∗
(0.417) 
1.307 ∗
(0.757) 
0.772 
(1.277) 
Starting a business 0.039 ∗∗∗
(0.010) 
0.137 ∗∗∗
(0.025) 
0.296 ∗∗∗
(0.044) 
Sandbox 0.307 ∗∗∗
(0.096) 
1.435 ∗∗∗
(0.192) 
1.839 ∗∗∗
(0.273) 
Cards issued per capita 0.737 ∗∗∗
(0.072) 
0.400 ∗∗∗
(0.139) 
0.387 
(0.253) 
Credit transfer per capita −0.005 ∗∗∗
(0.001) 
−0.014 ∗∗∗
(0.003) 
−0.025 ∗∗∗
(0.005) 
Direct debit per capita −0.007 ∗∗∗
(0.002) 
−0.013 ∗∗∗
(0.005) 
0.025 ∗∗∗
(0.008) 
McFadden R-squere 0.817 0.572 0.713 
Standard errors clustered by country and sector pairs are reported in parentheses with ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and percentage of online shoppers ( Internet Purchase ). Both of the variables had a significant positive impact on the number
of licensed institutions before the adoption of PSD2. In both cases, this impact was weakened by implementing PSD into
national laws of European Union countries. In the case of Population, it has taken a negative direction, which is a statistical
confirmation of the success of smaller countries in attracting newly established PayTech start-ups. The significance of both
these variables vanished with the implementation of PSD2 into national laws. The potential of the domestic market had a
greater impact while payment services delivered by third parties were in their infancy, and when the harmonisation of legal
regulations had not yet taken place. Since PayTechs and their services started gaining popularity and PSD2 became more
broadly implemented, other factors came to the fore. 
A friendly environment for establishing new enterprises, expressed with the Starting a business indicator, proved to be
positively correlated with the number of licences obtained by non-bank PayTechs. Additionally, the decision of PayTech
companies to apply for a licence in a given country is positively influenced by the existence of a regulatory sandbox in
that country. Furthermore, sandboxes incentivise entities that have already taken part in them to obtain a licence in a given
country. More so, the impact of both of those variables has been growing strongly over time together with the process of
implementing PSD2 ( Table 6 ). These results provide evidence that financial authorities possess administrative and legal tools
to stimulate the development of the PayTech sector ( Boyer and Kempf, 2020 ; Philippon, 2017 ). The activity of countries that
have already established PayTech hubs in Europe (see Section 3.3 ) proved that the creation of a friendly environment for
FinTech is effective. 
The very fact of having a regulatory sandbox seems to be an indicator of the positive attitude that supervisory bodies in
a given country hold towards the development of financial innovation. However, individual sandboxes differ significantly in
terms of objectives, mechanisms, and rules adopted for the participating start-ups. They also operate under different national
legal systems. Therefore, the issue of regulatory sandboxes requires further in-depth studies that will take into account
specific legal and institutional mechanisms of their operations in EU member states, as well as their precise outcomes. 
The specific features of a domestic payment system strongly affect the PayTech sector’s development. Before PSD2, more
entities applied for all types of licences in countries where consumers held more payment cards ( Cards issued per capita ).
Since in most European countries payment cards were the dominant way to perform online shopping ( Deufel et al., 2019 ),
their use indicates precisely where PayTechs would start building their businesses in hope for fast growth. Moreover, owing
to tokenisation and digital wallets, cards can be flexibly integrated with innovative solutions offered by non-bank PayTech
providers ( Laboure and Reid, 2020 ; Milkau, 2020 ). However, since one of the reasons AIS and PIS services were created was
to compete with payment cards, the popularity of this instrument started to be insignificant after the implementation of
PSD2 into national laws. 
The popularity of bank transfers has the opposite effect on the development of the PayTech sector. Credit transfer per
capita is negatively associated with the number of licensed institutions. It is surprising as the credit transfer is the primary
instrument for the clearing of transactions for services provided under PSD2. The negative correlation may result from the
fact that the highest share of credit transfer transactions amongst cashless payments is recorded mostly in the post-socialist
countries of Central Europe (see current ECB Payment Statistics (2020) and Silva et al. (2016) ). The PayTech sector is gen-
erally not very active in these countries (see Fig. 4 ). Earlier studies revealed the impact of institutional and cultural factors
on entrepreneurship and the specifics of payment services usage in these countries ( Deufel et al., 2019 ; Martikainen et al.,
2015 ). 
Before the implementation of PSD2 into national laws, the widespread use of direct debit per capita had a negative impact
on the number licences in a given country. This may be due to some conservative features of this payment instrument which
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require additional paperwork between the payee and the payer before transactions are finished and that the payment may
be refunded (withdrawn) by the consumer within a month ( Bacs, 2015 ). Direct debits are usually reasonable when it comes
to bill payment or other recurring transactions based on an agreement between parties. However, it is not suitable for
immediate one-off transactions between parties that do not trust each other – typical for e-commerce (The Paypers, 2019 ).
It seems that initially, PayTechs tried to reach ‘low hanging fruit’ in markets where payment cards were more popular.
With PSD2 implementation into national law, direct debits started to have a positive impact on the number of licences in
a given country. It can be explained by the fact that PayTechs’ managers may see opportunities in entering countries with
widespread direct debit, as they can try to replace this old-fashioned means of payment. 
5. Conclusion 
The PayTech sector in Europe has grown significantly after the implementation of PSD2. In just the last two years (2018–
2019), the number of obtained PayTech licences has increased fourfold. Complementing Europe’s bank-based system with
Third Party Providers promises benefits and growth for the payments sector. However, the PayTech sector is still very small
in comparison to the size of the traditional payments markets in Europe. The analysis shows that as many as 75% of the
PSD2 licences were obtained by firms operating before the introduction of this regulation, and only a quarter of the licences
were given to start-ups. Thus, in these first years, PSD2 had the greatest impact on the firms already operating on the
market who were forced to obtain a new licence in order to comply with legal requirements to continue operating. It may
also have been due to a desire to take advantage of regulatory changes and extend the scope of existing activities into
payment services. 
One of the main findings of the study is that following the adoption of PSD2 at the European level, the number of
newly established start-ups, which eventually obtained a PayTech licence increased significantly compared to the control
group. This brings quantitative evidence of the positive impact of PSD2 on the development of the PayTech sector in terms
of promoting entrepreneurship. Therefore, there was above-average investor interest in entering the market and seizing the
new market niche created by the PSD2 regulation. On the other hand, after the national transposition of PSD2 into individual
member states’ legal systems, there was a decrease in the number of incorporated start-ups, although it still remained at
a higher level than before the regulation was adopted. Thus, PSD2 appears to have been a stimulating regulatory shock
that temporary, and the long-term. The long-term impact of PSD2 on the development of the PayTech sector in Europe will
require further research which will become possible as the observation horizon extends. 
The findings of this study indicate three main drivers of the number of PayTech licences granted in the EU. Firstly, the po-
tential of the economy, measured by population and the popularity of online shopping, has a positive impact on the number
of licences issued. Indeed, all five major EU economies have licensed a significant number of entities. However, despite the
considerable market potential, some countries, like Germany and Italy, have not yet created conditions encouraging these
businesses to provide cross-border services on a pan-European scale. This may change in the future and, having succeeded
on a large local market, the PayTech entities operating in these two countries may commence their expansion. However, the
results obtained showed that the positive impact of high market potential occurred before the adoption of PSD2. 
Undoubtedly, a group of smaller countries, such as Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg, have already been suc-
cessful in seizing the opportunity created by the PSD2 regulation. They made the strategic decision to build innovation hubs
for PayTech start-ups with promising early results. Secondly, the authorities’ involvement in supporting PayTech develop-
ment has proved to be a key factor in stimulating start-ups in a given country and attracting investors from other EU and
non-EU countries. Research has shown that it is particularly effective to launch a regulatory sandbox which allows entities
developing payment innovations to test them on the market with friendly financial supervision and support. Undoubtedly,
the positive impact of the overall favourable climate for doing business in a given country cannot be underestimated either.
Thirdly, and lastly, it was revealed that a country’s consumer habit of concluding cashless transactions with payment cards
is an important driver for the growth of the PayTech sector, perhaps because many innovations are already based on the use
of payment cards. Besides, cards have a very high share in e-commerce payments in most EU countries, and at the same
time, this segment is also the main target market for PIS and AIS payment services introduced by PSD2. In the future, these
groups of payment services may become direct competitors. 
This work contributes to understanding the FinTech field both by (a) providing the evidence of the positive impact of
PSD2 on the incorporations of PayTech start-ups, and by (b) proving that market potential, the differentiation of domestic
payment systems, and the quality of the public environment for FinTech start-ups significantly affect the licensing of PayTech
entities in Europe. However, the limitations of the study should also be considered, since the data analysed pertain to the
licences for payment services, which only provides information about the potential of this activity. The actual number of
registered users, the number of transactions concluded, and the income of these entities were not available at the time of
the study. 
The presented results can provide guidance for the authorities and EU regulators regarding the initial effects of PSD2
and the approach to PayTech licensing in Europe. Obtaining answers to these questions, at an early stage of PSD2 imple-
mentation, constitutes an opportunity to shape stable PayTech growth and high competitiveness of this sector. In contrast,
late action could mean that the EU loses out to non-EU competitors and misses the opportunity to become the leader in
payment innovations. 
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Moreover, it should be noticed that over 40% of the entire PayTech sector within the EU in 2019 was concentrated in
the United Kingdom. It raises questions about the future of PayTech after Brexit. After the transitional period, since 2021,
UK-registered entities will not be able to provide services within the EU. Therefore, significant changes can be expected in
the PayTech sector concerning payment services providers’ headquarters and subsidiaries locations in EEA countries. 
The analysis has revealed that the issue of PayTech requires a number of future studies. Above all, it will be important
to assess the longer-term impact of PSD2, including more comprehensive company data and longer time series. In addition,
there is a need for qualitative and quantitative research on the functioning of particular types of PayTech licences, as well
as research on the organisation and efficiency of regulatory sandboxes which have proven to be an important stimulus for
PayTech development. The question about the role of payment card schemes in the changing landscape of open banking
also remains. 
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Appendix Table 6 
Summary statistics. 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
Cross-country data ( N = 28) Panel A: Time-invariant variables 
PayTechs Before PSD2 34.36 12.5 4 425 78.16 
PayTechs Before National Law 7.43 3.0 0 76 14.83 
PayTechs After PSD2 Transposition 4.89 0.5 0 71 13.68 
Population 18 220 781.21 9 265 478 450 415 82 175 684 23 620 381.28 
GDP 463 998.33 181 025.85 5 757.50 2 499 550.00 717 483.02 
GDP per capita 23 119.20 21 157.28 4 535.94 64 518.81 13 955.31 
Internet purchase 0.54 0.56 0.20 0.84 0.18 
Innovation Hubs 0.71 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.56 
Sandbox 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 
Starting a business 89.49 91.06 82.02 95.91 4.68 
Card payments per capita 141.16 92.30 18.30 366.10 100.76 
Credit transfers per capita 74.12 67.70 12.70 171.80 44.27 
Direct debit per capita 23.36 9.15 0.00 124.80 29.74 
Cards issued per capita 1.61 1.49 0.83 4.31 0.67 
Instant payments 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 
Years 20 0 0–2018, monthly Panel B: Time-variant variables 
Number of incorporated companies: Control group 
(PSD2-licensed companies aggregated by country and month) 
18.411 0.00 0.00 12 277.00 173.58 
Number of incorporated companies: Treatment group 0.005 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.08 
Table 7 
Type of companies employed as the control group. 
NACE Codes Description Number of companies incorporated 20 0 0–2018 
64.9 Other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 164,628 
66.1 Activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance and pension funding 265,798 
62.0 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 1349,418 
82.9 Business support service activities n.e.c. 1284,259 
64.1 Monetary intermediation 23,982 
63.1 Data processing, hosting and related activities; web portals 172,022 
Source: Orbis database ( Bureau van Dijk, 2020 ). 
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Correlation coefficients. 
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Institution 1 0.9910 0.9419 0.9619 0.4273 0.2414 0.2512 −0.0289 0.3610 0.3985 0.3715 
Inst_ Before_PSD2 1 0.8959 0.9221 0.4375 0.2030 0.2600 −0,0259 0.3840 0.3691 0.4085 
Paytech_before_National_Law 1 0.9757 0.3985 0.2938 0.2541 −0.0252 0.2756 0.4616 0.2055 
PSD2_PAytech_ After_National_Law 1 0.3913 0.2986 0.2375 −0,2375 0.2971 0.4265 0.2765 
Internet purchase 1 0.3400 0.4731 0.4946 0.5953 0.2751 0.2239 
Starting a business 1 0.1688 0.2164 0.0427 0.1043 −0.1348 
Cards issued p.c. 1 0.2574 0.3125 −0,0617 −0.2416 
Credit transfer p.c. 1 0.0773 −0.0426 −0.0564 
Direct debit p.c. 1 0.0773 0.5402 
Sandbox 1 0.3018 
Log(Population) 1 
Correlation Coefficients, using the observations 1–28, 5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.3739 for n = 28. 
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